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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL TEETH: SHARPENING MONTANA’S
CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT
PROVISION
Hallee C. Kansman*
Explicitly recognizing a right to a healthy environment would alter how
people think about the environment and our relationship to it. The mantra
“pure water, clean air, and a healthy environment” would take on the stat-
ure of an entitlement in people’s minds, becoming far more than what it is
now—a “nice idea.” . . . Constitutional amendments protecting the right to
a clean environment have the power to change everything about how people
interact with one another, with the world, with their decision-makers, and
with future generations.1
— Maya K. Van Rossum
I. INTRODUCTION
Charlie Russell, an American artist, captured the Old American West
and its landscapes throughout a series of paintings. Not only did his paint-
ings portray the beauty of Montana, but they served as the catalyst for the
establishment of environmental rights in the Montana Constitution. Bob
Campbell, a delegate from the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention,
explained how Russell’s paintings gave him the inspiration for the language
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of the “Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment” under Article II, Sec-
tion 3.2 In proposing the language, Campbell became a painter himself and
the right became his masterpiece and homage to the American West.
In 1972, Montana adopted a new Constitution, bursting with provi-
sions granting its citizens a plethora of rights. Among those is the right to a
clean and healthful environment. Article II, Section 3 describes the inalien-
able rights provided to the citizens of the state. The provision states:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include
the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing
life’s basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, ac-
quiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health
and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recog-
nize corresponding responsibilities.3
Rights pertaining to the environment are a common constitutional pro-
vision amongst states. Commonly, other provisions must accompany these
rights to bolster their influence.4 For example, in relation to Montana’s right
to a clean and healthful environment, the Preamble of the Montana Consti-
tution illustrates the grand desire for environmental protection, and more so,
environmental respect. The Preamble states:
We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty of our state,
the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of our rolling plains, and desir-
ing to improve the quality of life, equality of opportunity and to secure the
blessings of liberty for this and future generations do ordain and establish
this constitution.5
Additionally, Article IX accounts for the environment and the state’s
natural resources. Article IX employs a duty upon the citizens to “. . . main-
tain and improve a clean and healthful environment for present and future
generations.”6 The subsequent sections within Article IX detail the impor-
tance of Montana’s natural, aquatic, and cultural resources.7
Early versions of the right to a healthful environment required the leg-
islature to “. . . set limits, similar to those in the Bill of Rights, beyond
which even a majority could not tamper with the environment. . . .”8 Addi-
tionally, “. . . [that] right should give all interested parties the opportunity to
participate effectively in political and economic decision-making processes
which, individually or collectively, have a substantial impact on the envi-
2. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
3. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
4. RICK APPLEGATE, BILL OF RIGHTS 69 (Mont. Constitutional Convention Comm’n, Constitu-
tional Convention Study No. 10 (1972)) [hereinafter CONVENTION STUDIES].
5. MONT. CONST. pmbl.
6. Id. art. IX, § 1.
7. Id. art. IX, §§ 2–4.
8. CONVENTION STUDIES, supra note 4, at 250.
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ronment.”9 The right as written endured tumultuous debates amongst the
delegates with the intent to make the right as strong as it could be—creating
the sharpest teeth.10 The delegates stressed, “our intent was to permit no
degradation from the present environment and affirmatively require en-
hancement of what we have now.”11 Thus, the Constitution would serve as
the strongest source of protection by “. . . not [requiring] that dead fish float
on the surface of our state’s rivers and streams before its farsighted environ-
mental protections can be invoked.”12
This article stresses the importance of safeguarding inalienable rights,
while suggesting a coupling approach between the right to a clean and
healthful environment and the environmental rights afforded in Article IX.
Section II of this article explores the transcripts and the delegates’ inten-
tions during the 1972 Constitutional Convention to understand the purpose
of the right. Additionally, this Section exposes the mixed opinions of the
public during the ratification of the Constitution and the different publica-
tions at the time, which cast varied interpretations of the right. Section III
discusses the legislative and judicial authority pertaining to the Article II
right. The case law within this Section is solely comprised of Montana Su-
preme Court cases, with a particular focus on the importance of the
landmark MEIC decision. Section IV is a jurisdictional comparison of other
state’s environmental rights, exploring the state constitutions of Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Rhode Island. This section also
explores the Constitutions of other nations as well as theories that recognize
the inseparable nature of environmental rights and human rights. Section V
explains the current difficulties with the Article II right and what changes
can be made moving forward. This Section then proposes a strategy for
interpretation and a theme for future litigation.
II. THE 1972 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
A. The Copper Snake: The Anaconda Copper Company
Towards the tail-end of the 1960s, Montanans raised the undeniable
need for stronger constitutional provisions regarding environmental protec-
tion.13 The convention delegates, however, did recognize constitutionaliz-
ing environmental rights would face obstacles:
9. Id. at 250.
10. Cameron Carter & Kyle Karmen, A Question of Intent: The Montana Constitution, Environ-
mental Rights, and the MEIC Decision, 22 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 97, 109 (2001).
11. Id. at 110.
12. Id. (citing Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (Mont.
1999)).
13. Deborah B. Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right to a
Clean and Healthful Environment, 51 MONT. L. REV. 2, 414 (1990).
3
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That there is continuing degradation of the environment is scarcely debated.
The solutions proposed for the problem are highly debatable, intensely polit-
ical issues affecting all manner of private interests—consumer as well as
corporate—in an effort to recast the mold of that elusive but crucial “public
interest.”14
The principal reason behind the “intensely political issues” surrounding en-
vironmental rights harkens back to the Copper Kings era and their business-
centric legacy. During the 1800s, copper stood for wealth and prosperity.
Deemed the “richest hill on earth,” Butte, Montana, became an economic
center for Irish-American copper miners.15 Controlled by William Clark
and Marcus Daly, the copper industry and its practices emerged as a politi-
cal powerhouse—determining the layout of the 1889 Montana Constitu-
tion.16 Corporations, principally the copper companies, received far more
rights than restrictions during the 1889 Constitutional Convention.17
The dominant Anaconda Copper Company constricted the health from
the natural Montana environment. As one scholar wrote, “the deadly air of
Butte, thick with fumes of sulfur, arsenic and smoke from the open roasting
of its ores and from stacks of smelters, killed every blade of grass, every
flower, and every tree within a radius of miles . . . [t]he richest hill on earth
was now called ‘the perch of the devil.’”18 Early attempts to combat the
smoke came from the Butte Smoke Ordinance in 1890—Montana’s first
stab at environmental regulation19— eventually leading to the forced shut-
down of the Company’s smelter.20 The fear of legal ambush led the Com-
pany to buy out possible plaintiffs upstream and downstream of the opera-
tions.21
Aside from the minor attempt at repairing the environment through the
Smoke Ordinance, the destruction of the Western landscape was of little
concern until the mid-1900s. The realization for reclamation and cleanup,
driven by the demise of the Copper Company, sparked a strong environ-
mental movement.22 Montanans desired reform that accounted for  “their
14. CONVENTION STUDIES, supra note 4, at 278.
15. Kathryn R. Owad, The Role of Geography in the Genesis and Evolution of Environmental
Rights in Montana, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, 36 (2018), https://perma.cc/5KLK-M75T.
16. Id. at 37–38.
17. Id. at 40 (“Fear of offending the territory’s greatest source of capital caused the framers of
Montana’s 1889 Constitution to provide corporations with more benefits than restrictions. Afraid of
diverting necessary foreign capital away from the developing state, the delegates rejected a proposal
making corporate shareholders and company directors jointly liable for corporate debts.”).
18. Id. at 37 (quoting C.B. Glasscock, The War of the Copper Kings: The Builders of Butte and the
Wolves of Wall Street 55 (2002)).
19. Id. at 48.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 60.
4
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voice, their perspective” and not “Anaconda’s.”23 Aware of the 1889 Con-
stitution and its influences, the people of Montana convened the 1972 Con-
stitutional Convention.24 Although impediments were likely, the delegates’
language from the 1972 convention transcripts suggest a unified platform.
Spearheaded by several delegates, the environmental provisions in the 1972
Constitution accounted for the concern regarding the declining quality of
the environment.
B. Article IX, Section 1: Environment and Natural Resources
In his discussions regarding Article IX’s environmental rights, Dele-
gate Campbell stated, “the state shall maintain an environment which we all
say we want to be clean and healthful but we’re too timid to say we want
clean and healthful in there because it may cause some problems later.”25
His statement addressed the absolute need for environmental rights, while
alluding to the fear of giving the legislature too much authority. Illuminat-
ing the concern further, Delegate Eck stated, “I think the red herring came
in when we got in the idea that, because they were holding the environment
in trust—really the quality of the environment—that meant they were going
to take over all of the land in Montana.”26 Delegate Eck’s statement coin-
cides with the Montanan inclination toward individual rights, rather than
allowing a more authoritative body to control outcomes.
The Convention debates, moderated by Chairman Graybill, generated
the proposed language of Article IX, Section 1, emphasizing the inclusion
of the public trust:
The state of Montana shall maintain and enhance a clean and healthful envi-
ronment as a public trust. The beneficiaries of the trust shall be the citizens
of Montana who shall have the right to protect and enforce it by the appro-
priate legal proceedings against the trustee.27
This proposed amendment sparked the thoroughly articulated commentary
by Delegate Brazier—a member of the Committee on Natural Resources
and Agriculture. Delegate Brazier relied on an excerpt from the book De-
fending the Environment, to describe the difference between a declaration
of an environmental right appearing in a statute and one appearing in a
constitution.
‘A right with constitutional status does indeed create the opportunity for its
enforcement in the courts, but it also—and herein lies the danger—gives
23. Id. at 61.
24. Id. at 60.
25. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1221 (1972) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V].
26. Id. at 1221.
27. Id. at 1222.
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courts ultimate authority. That is, an environmental right declared by the
courts as a matter of constitutional law cannot be overruled by the legisla-
ture. By contrast, a court enforcing a statutory right . . . can always be over-
ruled by subsequent legislation.’ A statutory declaration of rights can open
environmental matters fully to judicial attention but still leave ultimate deci-
sion-making power in the hands of the elected representatives of the pub-
lic.28
Another amendment to Article IX, brought by Delegate Robinson,
concentrated on the rights and duty of individuals with respect to the ability
to bring a claim, or standing.29 Delegate Robinson summarized his proposal
quite succinctly, stating, “it seems to me that if a few frivolous lawsuits do
occur and that a few frivolous lawsuits is the price that we must pay for
adequately protecting our environment for ourselves and future generations,
the choice should be clear. The citizens should not be helpless to protect
themselves and the environment.”30 This proposal stressed the usability of
the constitutional provisions to protect the environment and penalize those
who degrade it.
Delegate Campbell proposed the final version of the language in Arti-
cle IX.31 His version read, “the State of Montana and each person must
maintain and improve a clean and healthful Montana environment for the
present and future generations.”32 The proposal received an overwhelming
68 to 19 vote in favor and became the language of Article IX, Section 1.33
In support of his proposal, Delegate Campbell emphasized the responsibil-
ity the state has in supporting a clean and healthful environment.34 He
stated, “a clean and healthful environment. . . is something less than the
Legislature has already stated in their description of what they want for the
state of Montana. I do not feel we can accept anything less than a clean and
a healthful environment.”35 The use of “clean and healthful” was not with-
out conflict. Delegate Campbell combatted the differing opinions by citing
to the concern of air quality in the state and the present level of pollution.36
He stressed that removing those three key words “. . . would absolutely take
away the incentive that the Legislature has had.”37 Thus, “clean and health-
28. Id. at 1225–1226; see Joseph L Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action,
KNOPF PUBLISHING 237 (1971).
29. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 25, at 1229.
30. Id. at 1230.
31. Id. at 1251.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1246.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1247.
37. Id.
6
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ful” captured the convention’s aspiration to leave Montana’s copper-riddled
past behind.
C. Article II, Section 3: Inalienable Rights
A few months after the approval of Article IX’s provisions, the Bill of
Rights Committee asked to add the following eight words to Article II, Sec-
tion 3: “the right to a clean and healthful environment.”38 As with Article
IX, numerous delegates were skeptical of the language and the litigation
floodgates it may open. Delegate Dahood interpreted the addition as an ave-
nue for citizens to bring a claim.39 He inquired whether the amendment
would provide the citizens of the state with the independent right to initiate
a lawsuit when “his own health and his own property is not affected with
the contemplation of the present law.”40 Meaning, if that individual’s envi-
ronmental rights were not at issue, then, hypothetically speaking, a person
would not be able to use the inalienable right to sue a corporation for pollut-
ing the Clark Fork River.
Delegate Burkhardt, who brought the addition, explained how the Pre-
amble to the Constitution allowed him to “believe in [the clean and health-
ful provision].”41 He stated, “I think it’s a beautiful statement, and it seems
to me that what I am proposing here is in concert with what’s proposed in
that Preamble; that what we are talking about here is the goal toward which
we try to grow as a society.”42 The proposed amendment overwhelmingly
passed with a favorable vote of 79 to 7.43 Although enacted subsequent to
Article IX, the guaranteed right to a clean and healthful environment and its
corresponding responsibilities, established the foundation for Montana’s
constitutional environmental protections.44 Thus, the delegates chose to
adopt a right with constitutional status, ultimately leaving interpretive au-
thority to the courts.
D. Ratification and Voter Information
Throughout the entire constitutional convention, the Public Informa-
tion Committee apportioned some of the budget for public education pur-
38. Id. at 1637.
39. Id. at 1638.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1640.
43. Id.
44. Deborah B. Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right to a
Clean and Healthful Environment, 51 MONT. L. REV. 2, 422 (1990).
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poses.45 The delegates attempted to create a committee to oversee public
education duties leading up to the June 6 ratification date in 1972 by adopt-
ing Resolution 14—the formation of a committee tasked with voter educa-
tion.46 A group of opponents challenged the Resolution in front of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, which held, “. . . voters had already received the pro-
posed constitution along with explanations of what changed fulfilling the
public education requirement.”47
Due to the Court’s ruling, delegates, instead, raised independent mon-
ies to support public education and traveled across the state to attend public
meetings and panel discussions.48 Although, during signing, all the dele-
gates were in favor of ratification, they were not as supportive during their
independent campaigns.49 During this time, Montanans wrote into local
newspapers addressing their concerns regarding the new Constitution, espe-
cially those regarding the environmental provisions. One woman stated,
“the environmental issues included in the proposed constitution are good,
45. Natasha Hollenbach, Ratifying the 1972 Constitution, MONTANA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, https://
perma.cc/2DNX-875B (2017).
46. Id.; see Mahoney v. Murray, 496 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Mont. 1972). (“WHEREAS, The Montana
Constitutional Convention has nearly completed its substantive activities and its making arrangements
for adjournment sine die in order to meet its election date commitment of June 6, 1972; and WHEREAS,
prior to adjournment sine die the Convention will not be able to complete its procedural, administrative
and voter education affairs, all of which must be concluded in an orderly and responsible manner; and
WHEREAS, the Convention anticipates that it will need to establish an appropriate committee to man-
age and conclude all of its procedural, administrative and voter education affairs after adjournment sine
die; NOW THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF MONTANA AS FOLLOWS: 1. The Convention hereby creates a committee to act with the
President of the Convention on its behalf after adjournment sine die, delegating to it full authority to
manage and conclude all of the Convention’s procedural, administrative and voter education affairs, and
to spend the Convention’s funds therefor, but only within the limits of its appropriation and such other
funds as the Convention may have. 2. The Convention hereby appoints to said committee the President
Leo Graybill, Jr., who shall act as its chairman, and the following delegates: John Toole, Dorothy Eck,
Bruce Brown, Jean Bowman, Margaret Warden, Fred Martin, Robert Vermillion, Katie Payne, Betty
Babcock, Marshall Murray, Catherine Pemberton, John Schiltz, Thomas Joyce, George Harper, Bill
Burkardt, Jerome Loendorf, Oscar Anderson, Gene Harbaugh. 3. No delegate may serve on the commit-
tee who shall seek public office in the primary election to be held on June 6, 1972. The President, as
chairman of the committee, shall have authority to substitute other Convention delegates for any com-
mittee members named herein who may decide to seek public office. 4. The Convention hereby dele-
gates authority to the committee to receive, disburse and account for all Federal funds which the Con-
vention may receive. 5. The Convention also delegates authority to the committee to supervise and edit
any and all voter education materials prepared on behalf of the Convention or by other persons relative
to the work of the Convention. 6. The committee shall terminate its work at such time as all of the
Convention’s procedural, administrative and educational affairs have been completed, and all require-
ments of the Enabling Act have been met.”).
47. HOLLENBACH, supra note 45; see State ex. rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, 496 P.2d 1127 (Mont.
1972).
48. HOLLENBACH, supra note 45.
49. Id.
8
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but the convention could have done more to protect the environment.”50
Another Montanan had quite the opposite view, stating, “the proposed con-
stitution emphasized environmental rights over rights of the individual. The
constitution of Montana, whether it is the present or the proposed one,
should strike a proper balance between the rights of the individual and those
of the environment.”51
The Constitutional Convention Enabling Act only authorized the dis-
persal of a Voter Information Pamphlet, which served as the lone explana-
tion of the proposed constitution.52 Additional Constitutional Convention
materials—including the transcript of the entire Constitutional Conven-
tion—were not released until after the Montana Constitution was ratified.53
The Voter Information Pamphlet contained the entire proposed Constitution
and a sample ballot.54 The sample ballot presented four issues requiring a
vote: (1) for or against the proposed constitution; (2) a unicameral or bi-
cameral legislature; (3) for or against authorization of gambling; and (4) for
or against the death penalty.55 All votes were independent of each other.56
However, if the proposed constitution failed to receive a majority of the
votes cast, all issues would fail.57 Given all the public outreach and infor-
mation available, the 1972 Montana Constitution barely passed—with
50.55 percent in favor of and 49.44 percent against the new constitution.58
Delegate Campbell eloquently summed up the ratification process, “we had
the issues, we had the momentum, we had the vote . . . barely.”59 Oppo-
nents attempted to challenge the vote, however, the Governor and the Mon-
tana Supreme Court stepped in—with a 3-2 decision—resulting in the rati-
fication of the 1972 Montana Constitution.60
E. Interpretive Theory
Due to the post-ratification release of the Constitutional Convention
materials, the interpretive theory behind the provisions in the Montana Con-
stitution endure continuous scrutiny. Tyler Stockton proposes that the Con-
50. Gerald J. Neely, The Gallatin Voice, 1 n.2 (1972), https://perma.cc/58SL-AV98 [hereinafter
GALLATIN VOICE].
51. Id.
52. Tyler Stockton, Originalism and the Montana Constitution, 77 MONT. L. REV. 117, 122 (2016).
53. Id. at 122.
54. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH EXPLANA-





59. Interview with Bob Campbell, Delegate, 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention (March
2019) (on file with author).
60. Id.; see also State ex rel. Casmore v. Anderson, 500 P.2d 921 (Mont. 1972).
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stitution’s public meaning during ratification rather than the expressed in-
tentions of the delegates in the transcript served as the proper method of
interpretation.61 Stockton suggests the most reliable sources—in descending
order—for interpretation are: (1) the Voter Information Pamphlet; (2) the
Roeder Pamphlet; (3) the Neely Pamphlet; (4) The Constitutional Conven-
tion Transcripts; (5) the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission
Reports; (6) the 1889 Constitution; (7) the ratification era newspaper arti-
cles and opinion pieces; (8) the varying private documents, correspondence,
or association materials; and (9) opposition materials.62 Although a struc-
tured approach, Stockton’s theory lacks judicial support. Historically, the
Montana Supreme Court “has cited or referred to the Constitutional Con-
vention transcripts at least 164 times . . .” and “. . . has referred to only 13
other ratification era sources and only four of those references come after
the transcripts were published.”63 Given the constant reliance on convention
transcripts, it is surprising how the Montana Supreme Court strays away
from the delegates interpretation of the Article II right to a clean and health-
ful environment. This pattern will be discussed further in Section III and
Section V.
Of the sources apart from the transcripts, the Neely Pamphlet serves as
a detailed critique of the proposed constitution.64 In its analysis of the ina-
lienable rights, the pamphlet states:
The immediate question is whether the new provision creates the right for
all such necessities of life and health to be provided by the public treasury.
The provision is clearly aimed at elevating public assistance benefits from
the level of privilege to that of right, and to provide for standards of proce-
dural fairness in their denial.65
It is evident from this view, in merely stating that each citizen is afforded
this right and leaving out any seemingly working effect, the right itself may
be inoperative.66 The Neely Pamphlet exposed the consequences and diffi-
culties of making a broad constitutional right and left the looming question
of if the right could ever provide public assistance.
Additionally, the Gallatin Voice included an editorial piece focused on
the political philosophy behind the bill of rights section.67 The editorial de-
61. Stockton, supra note 52, at 117–18; see Johnstone, The Montana Constitution in the State
Constitutional Tradition 12 (2019) (on file with author).
62. Id. at 143–48; see VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, supra note 54; see also Concerned Citizens
for Constitutional Improvement, Proposed Constitution for the State of Montana 11 (1972), available at
http://perma.cc/P5UG-ZPEC; see also GALLATIN VOICE, supra note 50.
63. Stockton, supra note 52; see Johnstone, The Montana Constitution in the State Constitutional
Tradition 12 (2019).
64. NEELY PAMPHLET, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. GALLATIN VOICE, supra note 50.
10
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fines a right as “a moral principle that defines the people’s assured free-
doms.”68 Some of the qualities of a right are: “they are absolute; they per-
tain to action; they are the same for everyone.”69 The editorial takes the
cynical view that the individual’s rights are sacrificed.70 It first attempts to
determine the meaning of the right to a clean and healthful environment,
stating, “presumably, it means that a clean and healthful environment is
guaranteed by the government at the expense of the taxpayer through legis-
lation directed toward the people.”71 The editorial explains when the gov-
ernment is given the right to take measures to provide the right, it does so at
the expense of the individuals who are afforded that right.72 What such
views fail to recognize is the right to the enjoyment of health is an aspect of
the right of personal security.
The right to the enjoyment of health is a subdivision of the right of
personal security, one of the absolute rights of persons.73 The definition
implies a connection with the federally-guaranteed right to personal security
within the Federal Constitution. The United States Constitution served as a
template for the Montana Constitution, thus it seems fitting the drafters
would synonymously associate the right to personal security and health
with the right to a clean and healthful environment.74 The plain meaning of
environment suggests human involvement can attribute to environmental
degradation, specifically when incorporating the definition of environmen-
tal factors.75 If human activity is a known factor of harm then it is likely an
environmental factor. Furthermore, the delegates likely considered how to
integrate the state within the meaning of environment. Besides the inclusion
of the words, “the State,” it is safe to assume the delegates considered the
word “organization” in the definition of environmental factors to be synon-
ymous with any authoritative entity, thereby extending to mean the state.76
Another angle Neely addresses is the meaning of the final sentence in
the inalienable rights, “. . . in enjoying these rights, the people recognize
corresponding responsibilities . . .,” and how this impacts the environ-





73. The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary, “Health” (2012).
74. G. Alan Tarr, The Montana Constitution: A National Perspective, 64 MONT. L. REV. 1, 14–19
(2003).
75. The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary, “Environment” (2012).
76. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 25, at 1218. Referring to Delegate
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ment.77 Neely suggests this provision not only creates a right, but also a
duty. A strategy he refers to as, “a departure rarely seen in American gov-
ernment.”78 He toys with the notion of who is responsible for effectuating
the duty—a duty to each other or to the state of Montana.79 Neely also
elaborates on the Pandora’s box-like properties the right possesses, stating:
This one sentence, in combination with the new rights expressed in the same
provision, and in combination with the [P]reamble and the provision regard-
ing the right of privacy can also be construed as standing for a person or the
state to regulate conduct that is not currently recognized under our current
civil or criminal laws. Which is fine if the people of Montana are adequately
apprised of such intent upon acceptance of such a provision.80
In another similar analysis, one scholar suggests the words “clean” and
“healthful” are vague and the provision provides no instruction as to rem-
edy or enforcement.81 This approach, although centered around the termi-
nology, provides—yet again—another indication of the provision’s lack of
command. However, as mentioned in Professor Johnstone’s evaluation of
the Stockton approach,82 the Supreme Court continuously utilizes the dele-
gates interpretations and Constitutional Convention transcript rather than
the plain meaning of the terms. The clear definitions of the terms, or sister
terms, and the intent of the framers provides a substantial basis of the mean-
ing behind the provision and how it can be applied. Further exploration of
the provision’s meaning is discussed throughout landmark Clean and
Healthful Environment cases.
III. ACCOMPANYING STATUTORY AUTHORITY & CASE LAW
A. Legislative Authority
1. The Equal Footing & Public Trust Doctrine
The Equal Footing Doctrine provides “the state’s title to a riverbed
vests absolutely as of the time of its admission and is not subject to later
defeasance by operation of any doctrine of federal common law.”83 Under
the Equal Footing Doctrine, title to the beds of navigable waterways are
77. Gerald J. Neely, The Bill of Rights, CONCON NEWSLETTER (1972), https://perma.cc/65ZU-




81. See John L. Horwich, Montana’s Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execu-
tion or Self-Delusion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323, 362 (1996).
82. Stockton, supra note 52; see Johnstone, The Montana Constitution in the State Constitutional
Tradition 12 (2019).
83. Dennison A. Butler, Riparian Rights, Navigability, and the Equal Footing Doctrine in Mon-
tana, 38 PUB. LANDS & RESOURCES L. REV. 187, 197–98 (2017).
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subject to state law, including the Public Trust Doctrine.84 “[O]nce the state
obtains sovereignty over navigable riverbeds, the United States has ceded
all its title and thus the public trust doctrine governing the State’s disposi-
tion of such lands ‘remains a matter of state law.’”85
In Montana, the Public Trust Doctrine rests under Section 77–1–102
of the Montana Code Annotated.86 It states, “the state-owned riverbeds are
public lands of the state that are held in trust for the people as provided in
Article X, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution.”87 Under the Public
Trust Doctrine, the active beds of all navigable waterways are public lands
that are held in trust for the people of the state.88 One of the first proposed
amendments to the language of Article IX, Section 1 included the public
trust, but was later excluded due to the presumption that it would no longer
be the people’s right.89
2. The Montana Environmental Policy Act
One year before the Constitutional Convention, the Legislature passed
the Montana Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”).90 MEPA asserts:
It is the continuing policy of the state of Montana, in cooperation with the
federal government, local governments and other concerned public and pri-
vate organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including fi-
nancial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and pro-
mote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can coexist in productive harmony. . ., and to fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations
of Montanans.91
MEPA directs the state to consider substantive versus procedural debate
and significant effects.92 In a review for significant effects, the state must
evaluate any major state action for its effect on the quality of the human
environment.93 The directive of the Act and the requirements within it,
likely served as a pillar in the development of the fundamental right to a
clean and healthful environment. In fact, the Article II right and the Article
IX rights encompass some of the same language as contained in MEPA,
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-102 (2019).
87. Id.
88. Butler, supra note 83, at 198–99 (citing Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682
P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984)).
89. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 25, at 1226–27.
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again illustrating the intent of the delegates in framing the rights as interre-
lated and interdependent.94
3. The 1973 Water Use Act
Water was a major focal point during the 1972 Constitutional Conven-
tion. It is reasonable, given the tone of the convention, that strong and con-
tinuing legislation regarding water rights would follow only a year later.95
The Montana Water Use Act of 1973 included a water-rights adjudication
process, an administrative permitting system, and a water reservation sys-
tem.96 The Water Use Act—incorporating private property rights and public
values—effectuates the “common desire to ensure protections from down-
stream threats.”97 Although not included in the Water Use Act, the Sanita-
tion in Subdivisions Act adopted a more comprehensive approach to the
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences’ review of subdivisions,
thus expanding the protection of water quality.98 These further alterations
suggest a positive response to the directives of the 1972 Convention. More-
over, they suggest a correlation with the national trend towards pollution
prevention in the late 1980s.
B. Judicial Authority
1. Kadillak v. Anaconda Company99
In 1979, the Montana Supreme Court tackled the relationship between
the Article II right to a clean and healthful environment and MEPA.100
Butte residents—lead by the Kadillak family—challenged the Anaconda
Company’s application for a mining permit with the concern of unloading
of mining wastes.101 The Department of State Lands requested the Ana-
conda Company complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior
to receiving their mining application.102 In its analysis, the Court evaluated
the requirement for an EIS under MEPA, specifically looking at the duty
MEPA imposes upon the state.103
94. Deborah B. Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right to a
Clean and Healthful Environment, 51 MONT. L. REV. 2, 423–27 (1990).
95. Id. at 430.
96. § 85-2-101.
97. Schmidt, supra note 94, at 431.
98. Id. at 438.
99. Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 602 P.2d 147 (Mont. 1979).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 151.
102. Id. at 150.
103. Id. at 151–52 (The Court utilized a specific portion of MEPA: “MEPA provides, in part: “the
legislature authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and
14
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The Kadillaks also brought a constitutional challenge centered around
the right to a clean and healthful environment.104 The Court, however, de-
nied the challenge stating it did not contain enough merit for the court to
abandon the rationale of Flint Ridge.105 MEPA predates the 1972 constitu-
tion and there is no indication that MEPA was enacted to implement the
new constitutional guarantee of a clean and healthful environment.106 The
Court found:
[T]hat the statutory requirement of an EIS is not given constitutional status
by the subsequent enactment of this constitutional guarantee. If the legisla-
ture had intended to give an EIS constitutional status, they could have done
so after 1972. It is not the function of this Court to insert into a statute “what
has been omitted.”107
2. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality108
The Montana Supreme Court—in 1999—decided Mont. Envtl. Info.
Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, known colloquially as the MEIC deci-
sion.109 The issue addressed whether a statutory exemption from degrada-
tion review for water well or monitoring well tests violated the constitu-
tional right to a clean and healthful environment.110 In understanding the
Court’s position, it is important to discuss the factual background and appli-
cable approaches of interpretation.
In 1992, a company applied for a mineral exploration license with
plans to construct the McDonald Gold Mine Project.111 The Montana De-
partment of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) granted the permit.112 Three
years into the project, the company submit a revision of its work plan to the
DEQ in hopes of extending pumping of groundwater from the bedrock aq-
uifer underneath the mine.113 The DEQ initially approved the application,
laws of the state shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter; (2) all agencies of the state shall: (c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for projects, programs, legislation, and other major actions of state government significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement.””).
104. Id. at 153.
105. Kadillak, 602 P.2d at 153 (citing Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n, 426 U.S. 776
(1976)). “We emphasize that Flint Ridge and similar federal cases are uniformly based on the unavoida-
ble and irreconcilable conflict between federal statutes. Because MEPA is modeled after NEPA, it is
appropriate to look to the federal interpretation of NEPA.”).
106. Id. at 154.
107. Id.
108. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999)
[hereinafter MEIC].
109. 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
110. Id. at 1241–42.
111. Id. at 1238.
112. Id. at 1239.
113. Id.  at 1238.
15
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then hastily rescinded its approval upon realizing the water being pumped
from the bedrock contained constituents of arsenic.114 The waters within the
mining site were considered “high quality” waters pursuant to  § 75-5-303
of the Montana Code Annotated.115
The Montana Supreme Court determined the right to a clean and
healthful environment is a fundamental right under the Montana Constitu-
tion by relying on two previous decisions—Butte Community Union v.
Lewis116 and Wadsworth v. Montana.117 Butte Community held “a right
must be found within Montana’s Declaration of Rights or be a right ‘with-
out which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little mean-
ing’.”118 As the Court explained in MEIC, the right to a clean and healthful
environment is contained in the Declaration of Rights, and is therefore a
fundamental right.119 Additionally, Wadsworth held “the most stringent
standard of review, strict scrutiny, is imposed when the action complained
of interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or discriminates
against a suspect class.”120 The MEIC Court stated, according to Wad-
sworth, “any statute or rule that implicates [the inalienable right to a clean
and healthful environment] must be strictly scrutinized and can only survive
scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state interest and that its action
is closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least onerous path that
can be taken to achieve the State’s objective.”121
The Court made the distinction between the fundamental right in Arti-
cle II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1. The rights in Article IX are not
114. Id. at 1238.
115. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1240 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303(3) (2017)). Section 303(3)
“prohibits degradation of high quality waters unless the proposed degrading activity is reviewed by the
[DEQ], and the party seeking approval for degrading activity demonstrates by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (a) degradation is necessary because there are no economically, environmentally, and
technologically feasible modifications to the proposed project that would result in no degradation; and
(b) the proposed project will result in important economic or social development and that the benefit of
the development exceeds the costs to society of allowing degradation of high-quality waters; and (c)
existing and anticipated use of state waters will be fully protected; and (4) the least degrading water
quality protection practices determined by the department to be economically, environmentally, and
technologically feasible will be fully implemented by the applicant prior to and during the proposed
activity.”
116. 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986).
117. 911 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1996); Cameron Carter & Kyle Karmen, A Question of Intent: The Mon-
tana Constitution, Environmental Rights, and the MEIC Decision, 22 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.
97, 107–08 (2001).
118. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1245 (quoting Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont.
1986)).
119. Id. at 1246.
120. Id. at 1245 (quoting Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996)).
121. Id. at 1246.
16
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subject to strict scrutiny, rather are subject to middle-tier analysis.122 The
Court relied on General Agriculture Corporation v. Moore123 to explain
constitutional interpretation, stating:
The prime effort, or fundamental purpose, in construing a constitutional pro-
vision, is to ascertain and to give effect to the intent of the framers and of
the people who adopted it. The court, therefore, should constantly keep in
mind the object sought to be accomplished . . . and proper regard given to
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.124
In its reliance on General Agriculture and the transcripts of the 1972 Con-
stitutional Convention, the MEIC court determined the framers intended the
Article II right and the environmental rights under Article IX, Section 1 to
be “interrelated and interdependent.”125 Further, the Court held the two arti-
cles must be scrutinized consistently—applying strict scrutiny.126
The Court’s holding regarding scrutiny provides a method of enforce-
ment. In revisiting Horwich’s argument that the language of the right is
vague, the MEIC decision would not carry any weight.127 Another scholar
highlights the inconsistency of Horwich’s argument:
In addition to the right to a clean and healthful environment, other provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights utilizing words like “safety” and “happiness”
could also be deemed legally ambiguous. If those rights that have a clear
legal meaning are self-executing and those that do not are non-self-execut-
ing, then this model of analysis would render the majority of the inalienable
rights in the Montana Constitution merely aspirational.128
This reasoning, in combination with the location of the fundamental
right, likely defeats Horwich’s theory.
3. Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed129
Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed is only the second decision
given by the Montana Supreme Court concerning Montana’s constitution-
ally guaranteed right to a clean and healthful environment.130 This case in-
122. Id. at 1245. Middle-tier analysis requires the state to demonstrate that its classification is rea-
sonable, and that its interest in classifying is more important than the people’s interest in obtaining the
constitutional benefit.
123. 524 P.2d 859 (Mont. 1975).
124. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1248 (quoting General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 864 (Mont.
1975)).
125. Id. at 1246.
126. Id. at 1246.
127. See John L. Horwich, Montana’s Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execu-
tion or Self-Delusion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323, 361–62 (1996).
128. Carter, supra note 117.
129. 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001).
130. Chase Naber, Murky Waters: Private Action and the Right to a Clean and Healthful Environ-
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volved a contractual obligation between parties requiring Cape-France to
procure water through a well.131 A pollution plume had moved underneath
the property under contract, of which the DEQ warned Cape-France “if the
drilling or pumping of the water caused expansion of the pollution, Cape-
France, as the owner of the property, would be held liable for the clean-up
costs.”132
The Montana Supreme Court again determined that the right to a clean
and healthful environment is a fundamental right and interference with the
right required a showing of a compelling state interest.133 Additionally, the
Court, once again, highlighted the relationship between the Article II funda-
mental right and the Article IX environmental rights.134 Although Cape-
France was a private party, the Court utilized the MEIC decision and stated,
“while MEIC involved state action, we, nonetheless, recognized that the
text of Article IX, Section 1 applies the protections and mandates of this
provision to private action—and thus to private parties—as well.”135 As
Justice Nelson concluded:
Causing a party to go forward with the performance of a contract where
there is a very real possibility of substantial environmental degradation and
resultant financial liability for cleanup is not in the public interest; is not in
the interests of the contracting parties; and is, most importantly, not in ac-
cord with the guarantees and mandates of Montana’s Constitution, Article
II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1.136
4. Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc.137
Sunburst approached the inalienable right in a strictly monetary
sense.138 The Montana Supreme Court evaluated the constitutional tort to a
clean and healthful environment, stating, “to support its claim that a private
party must be able to bring an action seeking monetary damages against
another private party for a violation in order to vindicate a fundamental
constitutional right. In fact, we expressly framed the issues to be presented
at oral argument to include whether ‘the right to a clean and healthful envi-
ronment . . . is self-executing?’”139 The Court backed away from their
framework and aligned with the notion “that courts should avoid constitu-
131. Cape-France Enters., 29 P.3d at 1013.
132. Id. at 1013.
133. Id. at 1016–17 (citing Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 375 (Mont. 1999)).
134. Id. at 1017.
135. Id. (citing Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont.
1999)).
136. Id.
137. 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007).
138. Id. at 1088 (Mont. 2007).
139. Id. at 1092–93.
18
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tional issues whenever possible.”140 The Court heavily relied on the appar-
ent remedy available for restoration damages under tort law.141 Sunburst
provided the foundation for subsequent cases raising a constitutional tort,
one of those being Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corporation.142
5. Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corporation143
In 2007—a few years after Cape-France and in the same year as Sun-
burst—the Montana Supreme Court evaluated the issue of whether the right
to a clean and healthful environment provided for the recovery of money
damages in a constitutional action between private parties.144 The Court
plainly stated:
Where adequate alternative remedies exist under the common law or statute,
the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment does not author-
ize a distinct cause of action in tort for money damages between two private
parties.145
This decision highlights the Court’s consistent desire to avoid constitutional
questions if another regulatory avenue is available to the parties.
6. Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Mont. Board of Land
Commissioners146
In the most recent case involving the Article II, Section 3 right to a
clean and healthful environment, the Montana Supreme Court contended
with the right’s ability to serve as a companion with MEPA and the impli-
cations of the MEIC decision.147 The Court held that the leases in the
Northern Plains case were unlike those in the MEIC case, thus the leasing
interests “did not interfere with the exercise of the fundamental right to a
clean and healthful environment under the Montana Constitution so as to
require strict scrutiny and demonstration of a compelling state interest.”148
The Court also held that middle-tier scrutiny was not required, “because the
140. Id. (citing Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 136 (Mont. 2002)).
141. Id. at 1093.
142. 167 P.3d 886 (Mont. 2007).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 887 (Mont. 2007) (citing Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1093).
145. Id. at 888.
146. 288 P.3d 169 (Mont. 2012).
147. Id. at 174.
148. Id. (“Unlike the situation in MEIC, the leases at issue in the present case do not remove any
action by Arch Coal from any environmental review or regulation provided by Montana law. Because
the leases themselves do not allow for any degradation of the environment, conferring only the exclusive
right to apply for State permits, and because they specifically require full environmental review and full
compliance with applicable State environmental laws, the act of issuing the leases did not impact or
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statute does not adversely impact constitutional rights provided for outside
of Article II, such as the provisions of Article IX.”149 Finally, the Court
specifically interpreted the connection to MEPA, holding:
The requirements of an EIS review under MEPA have been enacted by the
Legislature in response to the broad directives found in Article II and Article
IX of the Montana Constitution. If no constitutionally-significant interests
are interfered with, then the state must only demonstrate that the statute has
a rational basis.150
The Court stated because the statute allowed the State Land Board to
generate a remedy, while still being held responsible for environmental re-
view, that the statute should receive rational basis and did not infringe upon
the Article II right in the Montana Constitution.151
IV. JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISON
A. The 1970 Illinois Constitution
1. Legislative History
The Constitution of Illinois—as amended in 1970—was the first of its
kind to include a separate provision concerning environmental rights.152
Those rights are found in Article XI, Environment.153 Article XI, Section 1
describes that “the public policy of the State and the duty of each person is
to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and
future generations.154 Although not included in the Bill of Rights, the Con-
stitution implies a fundamental-like right upon each person under Section 2
of Article XI, stating, “each person has the right to a healthful environ-
ment.”155 Moreover, this section provides citizens with an avenue for
suit.156
149. Id.; see John E. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guar-
antee—Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1082 (1974) (Nowak
calls the middle-tier test a “demonstrable basis standard of review” where the government must show a
factual basis of discrimination.) (“Under the intermediate demonstrable basis standard, classification
based on a neutral classification will be invalid if the state cannot demonstrate a factual relationship
between the state interest capable of sustaining analysis and the means chosen to advance that inter-
est.”).
150. Northern Plains, 288 P.3d at 174–75.
151. Id. at 175.
152. Art English & John J. Carroll, State Constitutions and Environmental Bill of Rights, in THE
BOOK OF STATES 18 (The Council of State Governments 2015).
153. ILL. CONST. art. XI.
154. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (emphasis added).
155. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
156. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (stating that “[e]ach person may enforce this right against any party,
governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and reg-
ulation as the General Assembly may provide by law.”).
20
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2. Judicial History
In 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court held a person cannot use the Arti-
cle XI, Section 1 right to a healthful environment as an avenue for stand-
ing.157 The Court held, where a constitutional provision is ambiguous, a
court may consult the drafting history to obtain the meaning.158 In its read-
ing of the drafting history, the Court found that:
. . .“healthful environment” was intended to refer to the relationship between
the environment and human health. The primary concern of the drafters of
Article XI was the effect of pollution on the environment and human health.
The right to a “healthful environment” was therefore not intended to include
the protection of endangered and threatened species. We also conclude that
the drafting history of Article XI indicates that plaintiff’s standing is limited
to providing him with an opportunity to enforce his right to a “healthful
environment.”159
Additional reading of the drafting history indicates the intricate
thought brought forth by the General Government Committee.160 The Com-
mittee selected the word “healthful” to describe the kind of environment the
state ought to obtain. The Committee stated, “healthful is chosen rather than
‘clean’, ‘free of dirt, noise, noxious and toxic materials’ and other sug-
gested adjectives because ‘healthful’ describes the environment in terms of
its effect on human life while the other suggestions describe the environ-
ment more in terms of its physical characteristics.”161
B. The 1971 Pennsylvania Constitution
1. Legislative History
The Constitution of Pennsylvania incorporates environmental rights
within its Declaration of Rights, under Article I, Section 27. This section
provides that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Penn-
sylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the peo-
ple, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.162
In its form, the right creates a mandate on the state to provide for environ-
mental protections, thus its enforcement is purely legislative on its face—
157. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034 (Ill. 1999).
158. Id. at 1041.
159. Id. at 1042.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. PENN CONST. art. I, § 27.
21
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straying away from the self-executing nature of the Illinois constitution a
year prior. Pennsylvania’s environmental right is detail-oriented and busi-
ness-like. It imposes an ownership upon the state over the resources as
“trustee.” Pennsylvania’s constitution also adds the language “generations
yet to come,” mirroring the Montana constitution’s “future generations”
consideration.163
2. Judicial History
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Robinson Town-
ship v. Commonwealth,164 in which it held that certain provisions of the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act were unconstitutional and violated the Com-
monwealth’s duties as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources
under the Environmental Rights Amendment.165 In its opinion, the Court
details the process for bringing suit under the Environment Rights Amend-
ment:
We note that the Environmental Rights Amendment accomplishes two pri-
mary goals, via prohibitory and non-prohibitory clauses: (1) the provision
identifies protected rights, to prevent the state from acting in certain ways,
and (2) the provision establishes a nascent framework for the Common-
wealth to participate affirmatively in the development and enforcement of
these rights. Section 27 is structured into three mandatory clauses that define
rights and obligations to accomplish these twin purposes; and each clause
mentions “the people.”166
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Right speaks for the people, rather than
through the people’s elected representatives to the General Assembly and it
speaks to the generations yet to come.167 Because the right obligates the
Commonwealth to act as the trustee, they have the responsibility to imple-
ment and enact new legislation that would benefit the environment.168 The
Court—like the Supreme Court of Montana—relied on the statements of
the drafters of the Pennsylvania Constitution regarding the creation of the
right.169 The Court firmly supported the intent of the drafters and described
types of Environmental Rights Amendment challenges a party could bring,
those being: (1) environmental challenges to development projects; and (2)
challenges that implicate a balancing of Article I rights.170
163. PENN CONST. art. I, § 27; see MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
164. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
165. Id. 913.
166. Id. at 950.
167. Id. at 974.
168. Id. at 957.
169. Id. at 961 (citing H. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess., 2270 (Pa. 1970) (quoting “[w]e uglified our land and
we called it progress.”)).
170. Robinson, 83 A.3d at 964–69 .
22
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C. The 1972 Massachusetts Constitution
1. Legislative History
Massachusetts’ environmental right is quite developed. A legislatively
enforced right on its face, Massachusetts imposes a comprehensive environ-
mental right for its people. The right details that:
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from exces-
sive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic
qualities of their environment; and the protection of the people in their right
to the conservation, development and utilization of the agricultural, mineral,
forest, water, air and other natural resources is hereby declared to be a pub-
lic purpose. The general court shall have the power to enact legislation nec-
essary or expedient to protect such rights.
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court shall have the
power to provide for the taking, upon payment of just compensation there-
for, or for the acquisition by purchase or otherwise, of lands and easements
or such other interests therein as may be deemed necessary to accomplish
these purposes. Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes
shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise disposed of except by laws
enacted by a two-thirds vote, taken by yeas and nays, of each branch of the
general court.171
Interestingly, the right specifies a great deal of authority in the legisla-
ture’s ability to preserve and modify the right. Not only do the citizens of
the state have a right to a clean environment, but they have a right to free-
dom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and to the esthetic qualities of
the environment.172 Article XCVII of the Massachusetts constitution, there-
fore, provides both a fundamental right and general environmental rights.
2. Judicial History
In 2013, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, illuminated the
ways in which a party can sue under the Article 97 right to a clean environ-
ment.173 It held that land taken for urban renewal purposes is distinct from
the Article 97 purposes provided.174 The Court provides adequate back-
ground, particularly noting the Quinn Opinion, which held that if a project’s
aims are consistent with the purposes of Article 97, then the project is sub-
171. MASS. CONST. art. XLIX.
172. MASS. CONST. art. XLIX.
173. Mahajan v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 984 N.E.2d 821, 823 (Mass. 2013).
174. Id. at 827–28.
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ject to the two-thirds vote requirement.175 In recent case history, however,
the Court relies on a more narrow reading of the Quinn Opinion.176 Rather
than using the intent of the drafters, the Court takes the approach that “be-
cause the spirit of Article 97 is derived from the related doctrine of “prior
public use,” cases applying that doctrine inform our analysis. Therefore,
Massachusetts relies on judicial precedent involving any project which may
affect the public’s use of the environment.
D. The 1978 Hawaii Constitution
1. Legislative History
The Hawaiian Constitution provides a right similar to that of the Mon-
tana Constitution. It states, “the State shall have the power to promote and
maintain a healthful environment, including the prevention of any excessive
demands upon the environment and the State’s resources.”177 Additionally,
under Article XI, Hawaii’s Constitution provides that, “each person has the
right to a clean and healthful environment. . . .”178 Distinct from Montana’s
right, however, the Hawaiian right to a clean and healthful environment is
defined by the laws relating to environmental quality.179 Rather than creat-
ing an interrelated and interdependent relationship between articles for en-
forcement, the Hawaiian right is self-executing in nature.
2. Judicial History
Hawaii’s case law slightly mimics that of Montana. In 2010, the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii clarified their environmental right to a clean and
healthful environment.180 Not only does Hawaii’s right have similar lan-
guage, Hawaii also chooses to interpret a constitutional provision in the
same manner as Montana: “[m]oreover, ‘a constitutional provision must be
construed in connection with other provisions of the instrument, and also in
the light of the circumstances under which it was adopted and the history
which preceded it.’”181
175. Id. at 827–29 (citing Rep. A.G., PUB. DOC. NO. 12, at 142 (1973)). Robert H. Quinn, Opinion of
the Attorney General Regarding the Disposition of Public Lands Under the “Clean Environment”
Amendment to the Constitution of Massachusetts, 3 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 495 (1974).
176. Mahajan, 984 N.E.2d at 828.
177. HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (emphasis added).
178. HAW. CONST. art XI, § 9 (emphasis added).
179. HAW. CONST. art XI, § 9
180. County of Hawai’i v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103, 1122 (Haw. 2010), abrogated by
Tax Foundation of Hawai’i v. State, 439 P.3d 127 (Haw. 2019).
181. Id. at 1116 (quoting Carter, 16 Haw. at 244).
24
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In this case, the Supreme Court of Hawai’i devised a three-part test to
determine the relevance of Article IX, Section 8: (1) whether the provision
under review is a law relating to environmental quality within the meaning
of Article IX, Section 8; (2) whether Article IX, Section 8 is self-executing;
and (3) if it is self-executing, whether the legislature had acted to impose
reasonable limitations and regulation that are applicable in the circum-
stances of this case, and which would preclude the party from maintaining
an action for alleged violations.182 Here, the Court found that Chapter 205
was a law relating to the environmental quality within the meaning of Arti-
cle IX, Section 8 because Chapter 205 pertains to conservation, protection,
and enhancement of natural resources, thus falling within the scope of the
right.183 The Court determined Article IX, Section 8 was self-executing in
the circumstances presented due to the legislature’s support of the environ-
mental right by creating supporting legislation which bolstered the authority
of the right.184 The Court makes the distinction that this support is strictly
scholarly and legislative in nature, stating “this court’s other decisions have
not directly addressed whether Article IX, Section 8 is self-executing.”185
Finally, the Court held that the law under review does not preclude the
party from bringing an action to enforce the alleged violations.186
E. The 1987 Rhode Island Constitution
1. Legislative History
Rhode Island’s Constitution gives its citizens an environmental right
tailored specifically to fishery and water rights.187 Other environmental
concerns involving air, natural resources, and wildlife preservation are only
implied as a duty upon the legislature rather than included in the inherent
right.188 Article I, Section 17 does, however, allow the legislature to “adopt
all means necessary and proper by law to protect the natural environment of
the people of the state.”189
2. Judicial History
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to face a challenge pertaining
to the “adopt all means necessary and proper” provision in their environ-
182. Id. at 1121.
183. Id. at 1121.
184. Id. at 1122.
185. Id. at 1128.
186. County of Hawai’i, 235 P.3d at 1137.
187. R. I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
188. R. I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
189. R. I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
25
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ment rights. Instead, cases challenging the provision involving “the privi-
leges of the shore” are more popular.190 Ludwig v. Coastal Resource Man-
agement Council191 does, however, provide a glimpse into the controlling
authority behind the right—that being the public trust doctrine.192 In this
case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court dealt with the Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Council’s decision to deny an application to build a
wooden walkover on private property.193 The Court held because the walk-
over did not benefit the public and was to be constructed solely on private
land, Article I, Section 17 did not apply since its provisions refer to the
right of the public.194
F. International Environmental Rights
At least 100 countries include the right to a healthy environment
within their Constitutions,195 and even more have enacted legislation to that
effect.196 Many of the lawsuits enforcing the constitutional right to a
healthy environment are successful in preserving environmental health and
integrity.197 This is primarily due to the common international principle that
“all persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound envi-
ronment.”198 While the exact meaning of a “healthy environment” varies
internationally, courts routinely emphasize the necessity to improve envi-
ronmental conditions:
Courts have ruled that the constitutional right to a healthy environment im-
poses four types of duties upon government: to respect the right by not in-
fringing it through state action; to protect the right from infringement by
third parties (which may require regulations, implementation, and enforce-
ment); to take actions to fulfill the right (by providing services including
clean water, sanitation, and waste management); and to promote the right
(through public education or mass media).199
190. Ludwig v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, No. WC 2009-0120, 2013 R.I. Super. LEXIS 140, *32;
see Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941); see also State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).
191. Ludwig, 2013 R.I. Super. LEXIS 140.
192. Id. at *32.
193. Id. at *1–2.
194. Id. at *32–33.
195. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 18 (John H. Knox & Ramin Pejan eds.,
2018).
196. Id. at 18 (stating that “[i]n total, governments of at least 155 nations have recognized the right
to a healthy environment in legally binding instruments, at the national and/or international level”).
197. Id. at 29.
198. YANG et al., COMPARATIVE AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 385 (Wolters
Kluwer 2020) (citing Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, Principle 2, https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/FrameworkPrinciplesReport.aspx).
199. KNOX, supra note 195, at 29 (stating that “[i]n addition, courts have consistently held that laws,
regulations, and administrative actions that violate the constitutional right to a healthy environment will
be struck down”).
26
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Two scholars—Erin Daly and James May—suggest a method of ad-
vancing the human right to a healthy environment by focusing on the mean-
ing, scope, and enforcement of the right.200 They propose a theory of envi-
ronmental constitutionalism, which is rights-based and human-centered.201
Therefore, “whatever the language or intent of the drafters, these provisions
tend toward anthropocentrism in application because the rights they guaran-
tee are invariably asserted by humans.”202 For example, a man in Peru chal-
lenged the government for a violation of his fundamental rights to live in an
adequate and balanced environment.203 The Peruvian Court held that it had
a constitutional obligation to not only protect the man’s rights, but to pro-
tect the rights for future generations.204
Similar to the Article II right in Montana’s Constitution, most “healthy
environment” provisions in other nation’s constitutions indicate both an ab-
solute right and a duty upon some branch of government or the people.205
However, some constitutions, connect “healthy environment” provisions to
other constitutional or international rights.206 In fact, environmental rights
can be found alongside civil and political rights.207 For example, some con-
stitutions recognize environmental rights to clean, safe, and potable
water.208 “The value of clean water can therefore be augmented by being
protected once as a human right and once as an environmental right.”209
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized the presence of a
relationship between the protection of the environment and the realization
of other human rights and emphasized the “interdependence and indivisibil-
ity between human rights and the environment.”210
Finally, Daly and May suggest there are four lessons regarding en-
forcement of environmental international rights: (1) put words to action; (2)
think big; (3) think about others; and (4) think about process by explicitly
promoting access to information, participation, and justice.211 Enforcement
and development of environmental rights is not an easy task:
200. Id. at 50.
201. Id. at 51. It assumes that a healthy environment can be assured or at least advanced by guaran-
teeing individuals the right to assert claims for violations against governmental actors.
202. Id. at 51.
203. YANG, supra note 198, at 387.
204. Id. at 387 (“It should be taken into account that any damage to the environment not only affects
the constitutional right in question, but also the rights of future generations. Therefore, the obligation to
protect and preserve a suitable and balanced environment must be fulfilled by all jurisdictional bodies at
all levels, including those charged with administering constitutional justice.”).
205. Id. at 392.
206. KNOX, supra note 195, at 51.
207. Id. at 53.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. YANG, supra note 198, at 393.
211. KNOX, supra note 195, at 55–56.
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The right should be expressed in such a way as to make clear its meaning,
its scope, the procedural and substantive rights with which it is associated
and meant to be supported by, and the enforcement mechanisms that will
ensure its effectiveness. Lessons from the experience at the national level
can be informative and influential for those considering whether an interna-
tional right is beneficial, and if so, why and how.212
Judges evaluate the language and drafting history of environmental
provisions; where legislative intent is clear one way or the other, the judici-
ary will defer.213 Some courts create barriers, for example, “interpreting
constitutional provisions as non-self-executing.”214 Montana is no stranger
to this trend. As previously mentioned, the Montana Supreme Court strad-
dles the line when it comes to execution of the inalienable right; from giv-
ing strict scrutiny in MEIC to side-stepping constitutional issues entirely in
more recent cases like Sunburst. This trend bars individuals “from invoking
constitutional provisions unless and until the legislature enacts measures to
establish precise regulations and standards governing the topic.”215
Another concept familiar to international human rights and environ-
mental rights is the use of “healthy” and “clean.” “A safe and healthy envi-
ronment may be viewed either as a pre-condition to the exercise of existing
rights or as inextricably intertwined with the enjoyment of these rights.”216
The right to a “clean and healthy” environment is often viewed as a prereq-
uisite for the enjoyment of other rights, especially for the enjoyment and
fulfillment of all human rights.217 Another theory behind the inclusion of
this language is that it is strictly survival based.218 “If the right to a clean
environment can be viewed as a survival need, it is truly a universal right
since the cultural aspect of legitimization is not a factor. The need for sur-
vival is universal due to every organism’s inherent need and desire to sur-
vive.”219 It is no surprise the Montana delegates wanted to include this
phrase given the strong international and national desire to advocate for not
only environmental rights, but human rights.
G. Relation to Montana
A recent regional study alluded to the public policy behind the deci-
sion to include environmental rights provisions rather than exclude them
212. Id. at 57.
213. Id. at 100.
214. Id. at 101.
215. Id.
216. EDITH B. WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 1023 (West Academic
Publishing 2016).
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and the impositions placed on the legislatures and the courts of those
states.220 They stated:
. . . it appears the framers of these amendments believed that even if the
language in most cases would not support unilateral private action against
serial environmental abusers, they would remind lawmakers, judges, politi-
cal activists and the attentive public that the right to a clean and healthy
environment is one of the most fundamental rights to which people are enti-
tled. While these reminders might be considered merely hortatory, they also
provide policy guidance to legislators, executives and courts who are en-
couraged to provide reasonable regulation and implementation by law in
light of their public trust to take good care of the environment for future
generations.221
Like the authors mention, the language in the rights may be moralistic
in nature, however, it provides the legislature and the judiciary with a direc-
tion in terms of enforcement. Montana’s fundamental right does not include
explicit language mandating the legislature or the courts to act like the Mas-
sachusetts and Pennsylvanian rights do.222 It does, however, include the
phrase, “in enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding re-
sponsibilities.”223 This phrase instills a mandate on the people, which in-
cludes the legislators within the state.
It is citizens who occupy and serve in the legislature in the state of
Montana. With 40 to 50 Senate members and 80 to 100 House members
representing unique districts across the state, Montana’s legislature mirrors
the temperament of the state—rural in the east and rugged in the west.224 A
legislator’s main responsibility is to serve during the legislative session,
which occurs biannually.225 They must balance the needs of their constitu-
ents with what is best for Montanans.226 Thus, the directive for all persons
to recognize corresponding responsibilities regarding the fundamental right
would theoretically outweigh the needs of a legislator’s constituents. Yet,
this is not common practice in Montana. More often, legislators—during
their brief tenure—advocate for their constituents, bringing forth bills each
session that highlight the concerns of the county they represent.
Should the constitutional convention delegates have added in a man-
date for the state to act as a trustee like Pennsylvania’s Environmental Right
220. Art English & John J. Carroll, State Constitutions and Environmental Bill of Rights, in THE
BOOK OF STATES 18, 21 (The Council of State Governments 2015).
221. Id. at 21.
222. See MASS. CONST. art. XLIX (superseded by Amendments in art. XCVII). Article 97 was
adopted in 1972 and references the right to a clean environment; see also PENN. CONST. art. I, § 27.
223. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
224. Montana Legislative Services Division, A Guide to the Montana Legislature, 9 (Mar. 2017),
https://leg.mt.gov/content/About-the-Legislature/2019guide-montana-legislature.pdf.
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Amendment? Should they have enumerated the specific rights to water, air,
and land within the inalienable right to a clean and healthful environment
like Massachusetts Environmental right? How will Montanans abide by the
directive of Justice Trieweiler in MEIC? Or, is the dead fish already floating
on the surface? In the following section, I suggest a framework for the
Montana Supreme Court to apply, primarily drawing upon other state’s ac-
tions and the existing relationship between the Article II right and Article
IX’s rights.
V. LOOKING FORWARD
Most importantly, the promise of MEIC must be delivered. With the
potential to be a lightning rod, it—instead—failed to achieve the spark the
1972 delegates intended for. Article II, Section 3 seems like a self-execut-
ing right, however, due to the interrelated and interdependent connection
between Article II and Article IX—a legislative mandate—the courts have
had no choice but to avoid claims involving solely the fundamental right.
The delegates of the 1972 Constitutional Convention had hopeful intentions
of creating a right so in-tune with Montanan culture; and, in fact, they cre-
ated such a right. The problem lies in their comments regarding the relation-
ship between the fundamental right in Article II and the general environ-
mental rights in Article IX. If the delegates would have placed language
within Article II, Section 3, indicating a compelling state interest or man-
dating the legislature, then the right would have more authority. As it stands
now, Montana courts—specifically the Montana Supreme Court—consider
it to be an aspiration rather than a right to be enforced.
A. Exploring Legal Scholars’ Work
As mentioned previously, the problem stems from the coupling of the
Article II right and the Article IX right; however, the interdependent and
interrelated nature could also pose as a solution. Human rights and environ-
mental rights are indivisible.227 Fundamental rights “are indivisible, interre-
lated, and interdependent. The improvement of one right facilitates ad-
vancement of the others. Likewise, the deprivation of one right adversely
affects the others.”228 Therefore, the co-dependency of Article II and Arti-
cle IX creates both a strength and a weakness contingent upon the court’s
interpretation of them.
The Article IX right instills a greater level of responsibility upon the
legislature, thus imposing a duty upon the state. Former Montana District
227. WEISS, supra note 216, at 974.
228. Id.
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Court Judge C.B. McNeil, who served as a delegate in the 1972 Constitu-
tional Convention, provided detailed instruction regarding the heightened
scrutiny given to the right during the Natural Resources Committee debates.
He stated:
The committee recommends the strongest environmental section of any state
constitution. It is the only constitutional provision with an affirmative duty
to enhance the environment. It mandates the legislature to maintain and en-
hance the environment. It mandates the legislature to provide adequate rem-
edies to protect the environmental support system from degradation. It pro-
vides that the term environmental life-support system is all encompassing,
including but not limited to air, water, and land. And whatever interpretation
is afforded this phrase by the legislature and the courts, there is no question
that it cannot be degraded.229
These statements, again, highlight the immense duty resting upon the
Montana Legislature. It is an affirmative duty and a prospective duty to not
only preserve, but to improve environmental conditions.230 McNeil, in that
same excerpt, referred to the shining potential of the fundamental right, and
set the stage for the MEIC decision.231 Yet, he refers to the much narrower
special concurrence by Justice Gray as the correct encapsulation of the dele-
gates intent.232 Justice Gray’s opinion mirrors that of Justice Leaphart, who
communicates in his special concurrence that the application of strict scru-
tiny, requiring a compelling state interest, is required for either the Article
II right or the Article IX rights.233 Justice Leaphart further acknowledged
the gravity of both rights in connection with state and private actions, stat-
ing:
I agree that state action implicating the rights guaranteed by Article II, Sec-
tion 3 or Article IX, Section 1, must be subject to strict scrutiny. Although
Article IX, Section 1, clearly imposes an obligation on private entities, as
well as the state, to maintain and improve a clean and healthy environment,
I would not, in the context of this appeal, address the question of private
action. In resolving this appeal, we are not addressing private action. Rather,
we are addressing state action; that is, the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute.234
While Judge McNeil relies on the constitutional convention transcripts
for justification of the provisions, Nelson utilizes case law from the Mon-
229. C. B. McNeil, A Clean and Healthful Environment and Original Intent, 22 PUB. LAND & RE-
SOURCES L. REV. 83, 86 (2001).
230. Id. at 89.
231. Id. at 89–90.
232. Id. at 93.
233. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1251.
234. Id. at 1250.
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tana Supreme Court—specifically Shammel.235 Nelson fears that the crea-
tion of a constitutional tort would “inevitably invite chaos.”236 He further
explains this fear stating, “[it] will likely result in the removal of predict-
ability in the fields of environment, economic, and industrial policy and
regulation.”237 These conflicting opinions between a delegate from the con-
stitutional convention and a young legal scholar showcase the complexity
of the right to a clean and healthful environment. This poses the question:
will the right ever be self-executing?
The short answer to that is no—at least not in reading Montana Su-
preme Court cases following MEIC. However, the solution could be as sim-
ple as learning from other states or other nations. The Montana Supreme
Court and the Montana Legislature already stress the importance of the in-
terrelated and interdependent relationship between the Article II right and
the Article IX right.238 Additionally, both the legislature and the Court util-
ize a variety of sources pertaining to constitutional construction and inter-
pretation, including the 1972 Constitutional Convention transcripts, case
law, and intent. Both the relationship of the rights and the drafting material
signify a strong, persuasive, and compelling nature behind the right. Moral
rights and legal rights are most certainly connected. There is significance in
incorporating human rights into a legally enforceable one:
It is not merely that as a matter of fact men speak of their moral rights
mainly when advocating their incorporation in a legal system, but that the
concept of a right belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically
concerned to determine when one person’s freedom may be limited by an-
other’s and so to determine what actions may appropriately be made the
subject of coercive legal rules.239
Schmidt and Thompson suggest to “inspire a realization of the ‘people
duty’ in the constitution.”240 They advocate for the Montana Constitution,
stating, “the Montana Constitution is both a legal and a moral document . . .
Perhaps the very first words of [it] provide the inspiration for the changes
that each Montanan must make in order to realize fully the promise for a
clean and healthful environment for present and future generations.”241
Schmidt and Thompson grapple with the philosophical approach to inter-
235. Kyle Nelson, Montana’s Constitutional Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment: Can a
Value Ever Be Assigned to This Right? Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corp., 29 PUB. LAND & RE-
SOURCES L. REV. 191 (2008); see Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corp., 167 P.3d 886 (Mont. 2007).
236. Id. at 194.
237. Id.
238. See generally MEIC, 988 P.2d 1236.
239. Knox, supra note 195, at 159.
240. Deborah B. Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right to a
Clean and Healthful Environment, 51 MONT. L. REV. 2, 444 (1990).
241. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
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pretation; yet, what is lacking is the reference to other states’ constitutional
rights to a clean and healthful environment.
B. Love Thy Neighbor
The idea to draw from other states regarding the interpretation of con-
stitutional rights is not a novel one. Historically, states either lock-stepped
with the federal constitution or utilized other states’ constitutions in the
creation of the first state constitution.242 Judge Sutton suggests a resolution
for the lack of honor state courts, specifically state supreme courts, give to
its own constitutional rights:
To avoid requiring each state “to construct a complete system of fundamen-
tal rights from the ground up,” the editors reasoned that the best approach to
developing state constitutional law was a model that “recognizes federal
doctrine as a settled floor of rights and asks whether and how to criticize,
amplify, or supplement this doctrine to yield more extensive constitutional
protections.” They thus proposed that state courts should “acknowledge the
dominance of federal law and focus directly on the gap-filling potential of
state constitutions.”243
As Professor John Horwich mentions, “we are not alone: other states
and courts have faced these issues.”244 Additionally, Horwich indicates the
“isolationism” abused by the Court in failing to consider the path other state
courts use in analyzing constitutional environmental rights.245 Montana’s
constitution employs a “Representative Democracy Model.”246 Under this
model, state constitutions are “the means by which the polity agrees to a
system of representative democracy through which they will determine pol-
icy and govern their interactions.”247 Thompson cautions the use of broad
environmental policy provisions under a Representative Democracy
Model;248 however, even the weakest environmental states incorporate en-
242. Jeffery S. Sutton, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, 174 (Oxford University Press 2018).
243. Id. at 186–87.
244. John L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning of Montana’s
Constitutional Environmental Provisions, 62 MONT. L. REV. 2 (2001).
245. Id. at 282.
246. Barton H. Thompson, Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of
Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 863, 866 (1996).
247. Id. at 881–82.
248. Id. at 891 (“Justifications for a broad environmental policy provision under a Representative
Democracy Model, however, are relatively weak. First, supporters have urged that, absent special consti-
tutional provisions, legislatures might slight the public’s significant interest in environmental protection
in comparison to the economic interests of the regulated community. As supporters point out, an unso-
phisticated public choice model bolsters this fear; the regulated community’s opposition to stronger
environmental laws is likely to be focused and intense, while the public’s support will be more diffuse
and thus less effective.”).
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vironmental policy in their constitutions.249 The difficulty increases when
discussing inalienable rights. Thompson points out, “inalienability argu-
ments for general environmental policy provisions highlight the difficulty
of determining what policy goals are sufficiently fundamental to include in
a constitution under a Representative Democracy Model.”250 Constitutions
utilizing a Representative Democracy Model require the courts to “play an
active role in shaping and controlling state environmental policy—a role
that courts neither appear to want nor are well designed to undertake.”251
The hesitation stems from the concept of separation of powers.252
The fear is somewhat irrational, however. For example, the Hawaiian
Supreme Court, in County of Hawai’i v. Ala Loop Homeowners,253 found
that the Article IX right to a clean and healthful environment was a self-
executing right due to the legislature’s emphasis on the duty upon the peo-
ple and the state.254 With an environmental right almost identical to Mon-
tana’s Article II right, it would not be unreasonable for Montana’s Supreme
Court to take the same position. Indeed, Justice Trieweiler did so in MEIC
and other states have done so as well.
Internationally, courts recognize the connection between the environ-
ment and fundamental rights and the duty placed on the people.255 Some
international jurisdictions have found a right to a healthy environment to be
judicially enforceable—relying on the right being fundamental in nature—
while other jurisdictions have found the right not to be judicially enforcea-
ble.256 For example, South Korea’s Supreme Court held that its constitu-
tional right to a healthy environment was not susceptible to judicial enforce-
ment.257 The Korean Supreme Court’s holding stemmed from the construc-
tion of its constitutional right, which places a duty upon the country to
249. Id. at 892–93 (“The Alabama Constitution proclaims that environmental protection is an impor-
tant state policy, while the Alaska Constitution mandates that the legislature preserve and enhance the
State’s environment.”).
250. Id. at 894 (The Montana Constitution serves as the sole constitution including an inalienable
environmental right.) (“Only one of the environmental policy provisions found in state constitutions
includes the term ‘inalienable’.”).
251. Id. at 895. (“An informed, courageous judiciary is needed to help stem the tide of political and
economic compromises which have resulted in the current, perhaps irreversible levels of environmental
pollution.”).
252. Id. at 896 (“Courts generally have hesitated to require state legislatures to develop new policy
programs or enact new legislation. The rationale is partly constitutional. Courts also fear the potential
practical consequences of ordering the legislature to appropriate money or institute significant new regu-
latory programs.”).
253. 235 P.3d 1103 (Haw. 2010).
254. County of Hawai’i, 235 P.3d at 1122.
255. YANG, supra note 198 at 376.
256. Id. at 390–91.
257. Id. at 391; see Supreme Court Decisions 2004 MA 1148–49, https://perma.cc/59UK-BM4S
(2006).
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protect the environment and implement various plans so that citizens can
live a healthy life.258 The implementation of the duty came from the crea-
tion of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy, which precluded the
aggrieved party from seeking resolution under the constitutional right to a
healthy environment.259 The decision signifies how a nation can meet its
constitutional duty pertaining to the environment through implementation
of legislation, while leaving open the theory that without legislation the
constitutional right is judicially enforceable.
C. Breaking Apart the Article IX Right
Article II may not be the governing right that the delegates intended it
to be, but that doesn’t mean that it isn’t the golden standard. Article II likely
serves as the “umbrella standard”; something for citizens of the state to
abide by and live by. While Article II should most certainly be referenced,
Article IX should serve as the powerhouse and provide the avenue for a
claim. Article IX, like other rights in the Montana Constitution (i.e. educa-
tional rights) provide a directive for drafting a constitutional claim. To
demonstrate this, I have diagrammed Article IX’s provisions. Below is the
complete language of Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX:
SECTION 1. PROTECTION AND IMPROVEMENT. (1) The state and each person
shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana
for present and future generations. (2) The legislature shall provide for the
administration and enforcement of this duty. (3) The legislature shall pro-
vide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support
system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unrea-
sonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.
SECTION 2. RECLAMATION. (1) All lands disturbed by the taking of natural
resources shall be reclaimed. The legislature shall provide effective require-
ments and standards for the reclamation of lands disturbed. (2) The legisla-
ture shall provide for a fund, to be known as the resource indemnity trust of
the state of Montana, to be funded by such taxes on the extraction of natural
resources as the legislature may from time to time impose for that purpose.
(3) The principal of the resource indemnity trust shall forever remain invio-
late in an amount of one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000), guaran-
teed by the state against loss or diversion.260
Section 1, subsection (1) conveys a duty upon the people and the
state.261 It implores that each person shall maintain and improve the “clean
258. YANG, supra note 198 at 391.
259. Id.
260. MONT. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1–2.
261. Id. art. IX, § 1(1).
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and healthful environment” for both present and future generations.262
Again, indicating that this task rests upon all people of the state, not just the
legislature. Subsection (1) creates the connection back to Article II with its
use of “clean and healthful.” It acts as an homage to the fundamental right,
while potentially giving it teeth. Article IX, Section 1, subsection (1) thus
serves as a first step in bringing a constitutional claim regarding the Article
II right and a first step in the proposed framework suggested in this article.
The court’s analysis should consider questions like: Do the people have a
duty in maintaining and improving a clean and healthful environment? Or,
do the people have a duty in upholding a basic human right to the environ-
ment? If the answer is yes, then the court should move to Section 1, subsec-
tion (2).
Section 1, subsection (2) demands the legislature provide enforcement
of the duty.263 Enforcement likely comes from accompanying statutory au-
thority, such as MEPA, the Water Use Act, and the Public Trust Doc-
trine.264 Enforcement may also come from other provisions in Article IX
itself, including: Section 2, reclamation; Section 3, water rights; and Section
6, noxious weed management trust fund.265 This subsection should act as
the second step in the court’s analysis of a constitutional challenge and
should ask: Has the legislature created constitutional or statutory authority
relating to the right to a clean and healthful environment? If the answer is
yes, then the court should move to Section 1, subsection (3) as the final
step.
Section 1, subsection (3) requires the legislature to provide adequate
remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural re-
sources.266 This provision includes the words “adequate” and “unreasona-
ble,” which can be used as a baseline amount for the court in determining a
remedy for a constitutional challenge. During the 1972 Constitutional Con-
vention, Delegate Robinson indicated that “adequate remedies” could per-
haps mean that the “Legislature set up access to the courts to sue.”267 Addi-
tionally, she stated, “the Legislature could conceivably, and perhaps they
would, say that they have created an environmental quality council and the
adequate remedy to protect your environment is to file a complaint with
that.”268 In the majority proposal, the delegates serving on the Natural Re-
sources and Agriculture Committee purposefully avoided definitions to pre-
262. Id. art. IX, § 1(1).
263. Id. art. IX, § 1(2).
264. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75–1–103, 85–2–101, 77–1–102 (2019).
265. MONT. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2, 3, & 6.
266. Id. art. IX, § 1(3) (emphasis added).
267. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 25, at 1229.
268. Id.
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clude being restrictive.269 They created a relationship between the adequate
remedies required and the environmental life support system and stated
“there is no question that [the environmental life support system] can be
degraded.”270
Additionally, the Committee considered how to address suits which
did not indicate an actual showing of some damage.271 The majority stated
that because the proposal requires the legislature to provide whatever rem-
edy necessary to prevent degradation and unreasonable depletion, that “this
is the best Article for the protection of the Montana environment for its
people.”272 Meaning, Article IX serves as the adequate remedy for a consti-
tutional challenge to the right to a clean and healthful environment. In the
court’s analysis, it should ask: Is the adequate remedy found within Article
IX? If so, was the degradation and depletion unreasonable, warranting rec-
lamation damages under Section 2?
Sunburst serves as an example of the court awarding reclamation dam-
ages in relation to the clean and healthful environment.273 Although the
Court avoided the Article II constitutional tort, it stated, “an award of resto-
ration damages serves to ensure a clean and healthful environment.”274 This
statement demonstrates the Court’s willingness to discuss the clean and
healthful environment, but also its failure to recognize the existing reclama-
tion remedy under Article IX. If the Montana Supreme Court were to utilize
the three-part test under Article IX for any constitutional challenges to Arti-
cle II, we might see more cases that effectively utilize the right to a clean
and healthful environment.
Another case before the Montana Supreme Court which followed the
intent of the delegates and diagrammed the right was Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue.275 The Court bluntly stated that the delegates intent
controls the interpretation of a constitutional provision.276 The Court de-
fined the delegates intent as:
‘[N]ot only from the plain meaning of the language used, but also in
light of the historical and surrounding circumstances under which the dele-
gates drafted the Constitution, the nature of the subject matter they faced,
and the objective they sought to achieve.’ Accordingly, we, ‘determine the
meaning and intent of constitutional provisions from the plain meaning of
the language used without resort to extrinsic aids except when the language
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1233.
271. 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 555 (1979).
272. Id.
273. See Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079, 1092 (Mont. 2007).
274. Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1093.
275. Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 609 (Mont. 2018).
276. Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 609.
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is vague, or ambiguous, or extrinsic aids clearly manifest an intent not ap-
parent from the express language.’277
The Court took time to diagram each phrase and word within the pro-
vision and held that “the plain language of Article X, Section 6, and the
Constitutional Convention Transcripts demonstrating the delegates’ clear
objective to firmly prohibit aid to sectarian schools lead us to the conclu-
sion that the delegates intended [the Article] to broadly and strictly prohibit
aid to sectarian schools.”278 If the Court is willing to diagram a provision
from Article X using the delegates’ intent and extrinsic aids, then it should
extend this interpretive method to Article IX and thus Article II.
D. Learning from Article X: Education and Public Lands
Article X in the Montana Constitution provides for the rights to educa-
tion and public lands.279 Like Article IX, Section 1 of Article X begins with
broad, overarching rights, then becomes more intricate and specific as to the
duty upon the legislature.280 First, subsection (1) provides a duty upon the
people to develop a system of education for each person,281 much like Arti-
cle IX, Section 1, subsection (1)’s duty upon the people to provide for a
clean and healthful environment. And second, Article X, Section 1, subsec-
tion (3) places a duty upon the legislature to provide a basic educational
system282, like the environmental life support system mentioned in Article
IX and identical to Article IX’s structure in Section 1, subsections (2) and
(3).
It is worth noting because the educational rights in Article X are not
found in the inalienable rights section of the Montana Constitution, they are
not fundamental rights and therefore do not receive strict scrutiny.283 The
comparison between Article IX and Article X should not be a question re-
277. Id. at 609.
278. Id. at 611–12.
279. MONT. CONST. art. X.
280. Id. art. X, § 1(1–3) (“Section 1. Educational goals and duties. (1) It is the goal of the people to
establish a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of each person. Equal-
ity of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state. (2) The state recognizes the
distinct and unique cultural heritage of the American Indians and is committed in its educational goals to
the preservation of their cultural integrity. (3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality
public elementary and secondary schools. The legislature may provide such other educational institu-
tions, public libraries, and educational programs as it deems desirable. It shall fund and distribute in an
equitable manner to the school districts the state’s share of the cost of the basic elementary and secon-
dary school system.”).
281. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
282. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3).
283. Bartmess v. Board of Trs of Sch. District No. 1, 726 P.2d 801, 804–05 (Mont. 1986) (“We
further hold that this right is not a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution; but that such right
is clearly subject to constitutional protection and that a middle-tier analysis is to be applied for constitu-
tional equal protection purposes.”).
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garding the level of scrutiny, rather it should focus on the Montana Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of Article X and how that can be used to inter-
pret Article IX and the clean and healthful environment. In Helena Elemen-
tary School District No. 1 v. State,284 the Montana Supreme Court utilized
the plain meaning of the provision and the intent of the delegates to inter-
pret the provision.285 It stated, “we conclude that the plain meaning of the
second sentence of subsection (1) is that each person is guaranteed equality
of educational opportunity. The plain meaning of that sentence is clear and
unambiguous.”286 Furthermore, they indicated the legislature’s duty within
subsection (3) is not a limitation on the guarantee of equal educational op-
portunity under subsection (1), stating:
The guarantee provision of subsection (1) is not limited to any one branch of
government. Clearly the guarantee of equal educational opportunity is bind-
ing upon all three branches of government, the legislative as well as the
executive and judicial branches. We specifically conclude that the guarantee
of equality of educational opportunity applies to each person of the State of
Montana and is binding upon all branches of government whether at the
state, local, or school district level. We hold that the last sentence of subsec-
tion (3) is not a limiting provision on the guarantee of equal educational
opportunity contained in subsection (1).287
Given the structural kinship between Article X and Article IX, the
Montana Supreme Court should consider a similar concept regarding the
duty to maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment. Although
a “guarantee” is not the same as a “right,” the Court has held it to that
standard in educational cases and thus a right should not be limited to any
one branch of government as the Helena case holds. If the Court extends
this concept to environmental rights, then this analysis should only apply to
those contained in Article IX. Recall, however, that Article IX includes the
term “clean and healthful environment,” which is also included in the fun-
damental right under Article II, thus the Court should include the funda-
mental right in its interpretation of Article IX. This method would avoid the
need for a strict scrutiny analysis, while accounting for the Article II right
under the interrelated and interdependent relationship.
E. Proposing Future Article II/Article IX Cases
A perfect environmental rights case does not exist, yet. Future Article
II and Article IX rights cases in front of the Montana Supreme Court should
attempt to utilize a three-part test like the one suggested in this article.
284. 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
285. Id. at 689.
286. Id. at 689–90.
287. Id. at 689–90.
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These cases should also consider the teachings of the MEIC and Northern
Plains cases, as well as international law concepts regarding the intercon-
nection between human rights and the environment.288 Before, if a claim
pertained to prospective environmental degradation and no other avenue for
remedies exist, then the claim would receive strict scrutiny subject to a
showing of a compelling state interest—satisfying MEIC. Alternatively, if
no constitutionally-significant interests were interfered with, then the State
must only demonstrate that the statute had a rational basis—satisfying
Northern Plains. Now, cases should utilize Article II as the golden standard
and Article IX as the enforcer.
Northern Plains serves as a suitable test case for the three-part test
under Article IX. The three-part test would require the Court to ask: (1) do
the people have a duty in maintaining and improving a clean and healthful
environment; (2) has the legislature created a constitutional or statutory au-
thority relating to the right to a clean and healthful environment; and (3) is
the adequate remedy found within Article IX; if so, was the degradation and
depletion unreasonable, warranting reclamation damages under Article IX,
Section 2.
Northern Plains would satisfy step one because it can be reasoned that
it is the duty of the people and the state to challenge agencies that wrong-
fully conduct environmental studies, especially when those studies pertain
to potential strip mining. Northern Plains would also satisfy step two be-
cause the legislature created a procedure for environmental review under
MEPA. In fact, the Court stated that “one of the ways that the Legislature
has implemented Article IX, Section 1 is by enacting MEPA.”289 Finally,
Northern Plains would satisfy step three because the legislature provided an
adequate remedy under MEPA for damages pertaining to strip mining. The
remedies for reclamation under Article IX, Section 2 would only be trig-
gered if the degradation and depletion was unreasonable. The Court, in
Northern Plains, held deferral of an EIS under the facts of the case until
there was a specific proposal to consider was proper and thus the damages
were not unreasonable enough to contravene the Montana Constitution.
There were adequate remedies available under MEPA and thus there was no
need to consider Article IX’s available remedies.
288. See Mont. Envtl Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1250 (Mont. 1999);
see also Northern Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 288 P.3d 169 (Mont.
2012).
289. Northern Plains, 288 P.3d at 173.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although Article II is regarded as a fundamental right and one availa-
ble to all Montanans, it is generally subordinate to a statutory provision
having teeth. If the fundamental right has any teeth—based on previous
Montana Supreme Court temperament—they are premature at best. Thus, to
reach maturity, the fundamental right requires an accompanying provision.
The Article II right to a clean and healthful environment should serve as the
umbrella standard and Article IX should serve as its enforcer. International
environmental law principles should be considered for judicial interpreta-
tion of the Article II right in Montana. To do this, however, the Court must
harken back to MEIC and its promises. Like a Charlie Russell painting, the
fundamental right to a clean and healthful environment is a display of affec-
tion and admiration to the beauty and principles of the state of Montana
rather than a weapon against bad actors.
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